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Paul Fitzgerald and Elizabeth Gould. Invisible History: Afghanistan’s Untold Story.
San Francisco: City Lights. 2009.

This book comes recommended by such eminent authorities as Robert Dreyfuss, Noam
Chomsky, Selig S. Harrison, and Ahmed Rashid. Publishers Weekly describes it as “deeply
researched, cogently argued and enormously important.” In the introduction, Sima Wali, founder
and director of Refugee Women in Development, says it is “a phenomenal compendium of
history, research, and critical analysis of the complex dynamics that has led to the death of my
home country, Afghanistan” (1); it “clarify[ies] and correct[s] the record, and build[s] a
foundation upon which the whole story of Afghanistan’s past can be appreciated” (1).
Such indeed are the intentions of Fitzgerald and Gould. They expose the many blunders
of Americans and Europeans in creating the situation that caused Wali such despair: a broken
civil society, a government riddled with corruption and espousing Islamic ideas that were alien to
all previous constitutions, a persisting war with the Taliban, and the continued practice of honor
killings and other forms of violence against women. The story they tell is less invisible and
unknown or even new than it is an assemblage of details on what has gone wrong in Afghanistan
history, most seriously in the period when Americans have been involved.
The narrative eventually settles on the culprits whose views have informed the most
recent blunders in Afghanistan: the American “defense intellectuals,” whom the authors
describe as “modern-day high priests” who have been “elevated to an almost mystical level” and
who have prospered “in a morally and intellectually detached universe,” one in which “cabalistic
mathematical game theories” have been mixed with Marxist-Leninist propaganda” (88). In the
administration of President Ronald Reagan, these intellectuals included such notables as Richard
Pipes, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and Paul Nitze. These core figures constituted “Team-B”
and were charged with the task of “reading” the Soviet mindset better than (they said) the CIA.
They insisted that the Soviet military was far more sophisticated and its intentions far more
sinister than the CIA ever acknowledged. As it turned out, virtually everything Team B affirmed
was wrong (206).
The “defense intellectuals” in the George W. Bush administration were of the same ilk,
only even more arrogant and, as it turned out, equally wrong. What one of their number told
New York Times reporter Ron Suskind about their activities exposed their inflated selfimportance:
[He] said that guys like me were “in the reality-based community,”
which he defined as [including] people who “believe that solutions
emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality.” I nodded
and murmured something about enlightenment principles and
empiricism. He cut me off. “That's not the way the world works
anymore,” he continued, “we are an empire now, and when we act,
we create our own reality. And while you're studying that–
judiciously as you will–we'll act again, creating other new realities,
which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're
history's actors ... and you, all of you, will be left to just study what
we do.” (270)
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When the Americans came into Afghanistan in the fall, 2001, they made three
mistakes, according to the authors: (1) They placed reconstruction plans in the hands of “freemarket ideologues” who contracted with American companies that “burn[ed] up precious
reconstruction money on beefed up security while padding their bottom line with little if
anything to show for it” (page). (2) They empowered corrupt and brutal tribal leaders who had
been trafficking in illegal narcotics. (3) Believing their own “fabricated press releases,” they
turned away from Afghanistan to the conquest of Iraq, “thereby dooming the job that [they] had
just begun” (254).
Fitzgerald and Gould also have a problem with their colleagues in the media. As they
put it, “The American media … allowed itself to miss the real war, [being] snowed under by the
make-believe struggle of good versus evil” (207). The media, the authors say, maintained the
illusion that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was purely aggressive, “not in reaction to
American subversion”–a reference here to the admission made much later by Zhibigniew
Brzezinski, Carter’s National Security Adviser, that the Americans had sought to provoke the
Soviets into invading Afghanistan, which of course they did, in December, 1979 (163).
Fitzgerald and Gould are also peeved that ABC “rejected out of hand” their request to present on
TV their proposal for a negotiated Soviet and American withdrawal from Afghanistan (189).
Throughout the book, the authors attempt to explain behavior in terms of mystical or
religious incentives. Early in the book, they draw a line from the ideas of Zoroaster, who lived
in Central Asia over a thousand years before Christ, to the Reagan and George W. Bush
administrations of recent generations. The parallel the authors draw between the Zoroastrian
cosmology of light versus dark and the American rhetoric of good versus evil is assumed to
constitute a compelling logic. To support their strained connection between the ancient past and
contemporary affairs, the authors find mysticism and sacred agendas throughout history in this
region. Afghanistan has indeed been the home of a number of mystical movements, notably the
Roshaniya cult (sixteenth to eighteenth centuries) and many sufi orders (Bektashi, Mevlevi,
Chishti). And in the nineteenth century, Abdul Rahman (r. 1880 -1901), the powerful Amir of
Kabul, who subjected much of the country to his rule, was “guided by prophetic visions and
dreams” (49), though the authors provide no sources to support this claim. Upon these local
“mystical” views, say the authors, the Europeans who arrived in the eighteenth century laid their
own occult outlooks. According to Fitzgerald and Gould, the Russians and British were
“mystical imperialists”; Kaiser Wilhelm in World War I, who had interests in Central Asia, was,
in truth, waging a “holy war,” and Hitler’s chief ideologue of Arianism believed in “a cosmic
cycle” that would return humanity to a “pre-human godlike state” (70-71). Even in recent days,
they contend, many key figures in Afghanistan have been in thrall of unseen forces: CIA
director William Casey was a “mystical imperialist”; Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev was
enchanted by theosophy 204), and President George W. Bush was “driven with a mission from
God” (273). The authors describe the “defense intellectuals” of the American administrations as
“mystical holy warriors” who believe they are involved in a kind of Zoroastrian “final act in an
ancient historical drama” (17).
Such is the general message of the book. Unfortunately, the problems with the text are
numerous. A book that aims to expose what has been “invisible” invites us to expect a carefully
constructed case, a new story with convincing evidence and plausible argumentation to support
it. Rather than setting the record straight, however, this book displays an absence of the
disciplined thought and explication that their claims would appear to require. Instead of
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providing critical analysis, for instance, the authors argue in non sequiturs. Some of the most
confounding examples include the following claims: (1) During the Cold War, the Americans
“found it politic to make common cause with the Islamic right,” and so “in the birthplace of the
Zoroastrian war of light against darkness,” they developed a “black-white” policy that was
“regressive, dualist, and especially antimodernist” (83-4). (2) Because British foreign policy was
“steeped in mystical imperialism,” it would in the twentieth century “guarantee Pakistan’s
chronic instability” (78) and foster the appearance of “Afghanistan’s most reactionary Islamists”
(61). (3) The “efforts of Afghanistan's leaders to bring the country into the modern age and unite
the various tribes” was “aborted by the increasingly toxic mix of Soviet bureaucrats, Afghan
communists, RAND defense intellectuals, Wall Street brokers, and religious fanatics on both
sides of the Pakistani border” (222). (4) The American media was taken in by “the make-believe
struggle of good versus evil manufactured by a Three Stooges producer and an unholy alliance of
liberal Democrats, neoconservatives and right-wing Washington insiders” (207, sic).
Another sign of indifference to the usual canons of disciplined argumentation and
demonstration is their tendency to level broad and unsubstantiated attacks against individuals.
They claim that Zbignew Brzezinski “made the rise of radical Islam in Afghanistan a reality”
(248), which is both unsubstantiated and unduly broad. They also argue that the Afghan Relief
Committee and Freedom House were “concerned more with advancing Saudi and Arab interests
in establishing an extremist Wahhabist presence in Afghanistan than with democracy” (190),
which is not only unfair but also transparently untrue. The authors also allege that a “prominent,”
unnamed Afghan says that “Robert Oakley was–along with the CIA–the creator of the Taliban”
(230) when Oakley and the CIA have no place in any of the several versions of Taliban origins,
and if such an attack is to be taken seriously, the credentials of the attacker should be provided.
Equally disturbing is the authors’ claim that Zalmay Khalilzad advanced “the Islamic extremist
cause in Afghanistan” for as long as three decades (290), which is both unfair and
unsubstantiated. Finally, they claim that “the Trotskyisc philosopher” Albert Wohlstetter created
the worldview” of the Bush administration as “a weapon of war against Soviet Russia” (291),
which is altogether implausible.
There are also egregious errors in the book. The authors repeatedly claim–without a
source –that the mujahedin who fought the Soviets and the Afghan communists in the 1980s
targeted “power plants, factories and schools, especially schools for women” (179, 183-4). The
mujahedin were indeed culturally and religiously conservative, but if ever a school was burned (I
know of no such incident during the 1980s), it was not a mujahedin practice or policy; it was, of
course, famously the policy of the Taliban, who arose a decade later. Another error is the
authors’ misidentification of the largely Tajik Afghan fighting organization, Jamiat-i Islami,
headed by Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masoud. This is not the same organization as
the Pakistani Islamist organization Jamaat Islami, founded by Abul Ala Maududi (190). The
Pakistani party is indeed an Islamist organization. Its structure and practice are Leninist in
nature, and its agendas include replacing democratic process with Sharia Law. However,
Rabbani’s organization is no such outfit. Assembled largely as a Muslim organization to fight the
communists, it had only ambiguous social agendas, most of which focused primarily on
reinstating a society like that which was presided over by Zaher Shah in the 1960s, whose return
they favored.
We share the authors’ desire to have the “untold” stories of Afghanistan revealed, for like
them, we suspect much has been veiled from public knowledge. But whatever Fitzgerald and
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Gould have done to reveal the invisible or tell what has been untold is mitigated by the
interlarding of inflated rhetoric, flimsy evidence, and implausible logic. The volume falls short
of its billing.
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